By David Lewis-Hall, Barrister
The New Zealand Parliament has recently granted (1) legal personhood to a third natural entity, following Te Urewera (a forest) in 2014 (2) and Te Awa Tupua (the Whanganui River) in 2017. (3) Whilst this, along with other recent developments, may be good evidence of a continuing momentum in the rights of nature movement, they raise interesting questions as to how these legal developments may interact with the rights of nonhuman animals.
The Taranaki Maunga Collective Redress Act 2025
In January 2025 the New Zealand Parliament unanimously passed The Taranaki Maunga Collective Redress Act (“the Act”)(4), which recognizes a certain area of land, which includes Taranaki Maunga (Mountain), as ‘Te Kāhui Tupua’ – a “living and indivisible whole”.(5) The Act goes on to state that Te Kāhui Tupua “is a legal person and has all the rights, powers, duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of a legal person”.(6)
As with nonhuman animals, Te Kāhui Tupua is not itself able to exercise legal rights (at least in the sense that humans exercise legal rights in our human societal structures). The Act therefore establishes a statutory body (7) – Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi – whose purpose is to “be the human face and voice of Te Kāhui Tupua” (8) and whose functions include to “act and speak for and on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Kāhui Tupua” and to “uphold and promote the health, well-being, and interests of Te Kāhui Tupua” (9). Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi is comprised of eight human members, four appointed by the trustees of Te Tōpuni Ngārahuand, (10) and four appointed by the Minister of Conservation. (11)
This approach and structure essentially mirrors that of the two previous acts of the New Zealand Parliament granting legal personhood to Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua. As would be expected, the legislative framework is complex, the Act runs to some 127 sections and addresses at length the complex interplay between the rights of Te Kāhui Tupua and the rights of humans.
The wider picture
Whilst New Zealand is at the forefront of this evolving area of law relating to the rights of natural entities, these developments have had a wider impact and are also being seen elsewhere.
In 2008, Ecuador’s constitution was amended to recognise actionable rights of nature. (12) In 2018, the Supreme Court of Colombia recognised the Amazon River ecosystem as an “entity, subject of rights, and beneficiary of the protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration”. (13) In 2019, the Yurok Tribe passed a resolution establishing the legal personhood of the Klamath River. (14) In 2021, the Magpie River, sacred to the Innu First Nation people in Canada was declared a legal person with nine specified rights, including the right to sue. (15)
In March 2017, in a landmark judgment, the Uttarakhand High Court in India ruled that the Ganges and Yamuna rivers should be recognised as living entities with attendant rights. (16) In its judgment, the High Court expressly stated that it had been inspired by the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act in New Zealand which had only been passed a little over a week before the judgment. Whilst this judgment was ultimately overruled by the Indian Supreme Court, (17) it nonetheless illustrated an increased judicial willingness to recognise the rights of natural entities.
In a very recent development closer to home, Lewes District Council has approved a new charter which officially recognises the River Ouse as holding legal rights, including the right to freedom from pollution and protection of biodiversity. (18)
Implications for the rights of nonhuman animals
Developments in the recognition of rights for natural entities have been welcomed by the Nonhuman Rights Project as being part of a wider “global transformation in the legal status of nonhuman entities” and thus with positive implications for nonhuman animals. (19)
However, despite this optimism, nonhuman animals are conspicuously absent from debates, discussions and decisions about granting rights to natural entities. The three New Zealand Acts of Parliament and other examples cited above can perhaps all ultimately be seen as designed to protect, further or re-establish the interests of people or communities, present or future. Whether through protecting vital natural resources from pollution as in the case of the Ganges, the Amazon and the River Ouse, or making redress for historic wrongs inflicted on indigenous communities, the ultimate effect is to the benefit of humans.
For example, whilst the Act recognises the living and indivisible whole comprising Te Kāhui Tupua as incorporating all of the “physical and metaphysical elements” of the relevant land, it is silent on extending any rights to the nonhuman animals that may live on the land and form part of the ecosystem that has been recognised and protected by the Act. Indeed, there was no mention of nonhuman animals at all in the parliamentary debates of the bill which became the Act when it was passed by the New Zealand Parliament. (20)
This is perhaps explained by the important constitutional and indigenous context of the legislation, making it unlikely the debate would consider the wider implications for nonhuman animal rights (or that anyone would speak for or against the legislation on that basis). As Maisy Bentley aptly cautions on the Oxford Human Rights Hub Blog:
“As the rights of nature movement grows and more examples emerge of legal personhood being conferred to natural entities, there is often much excitement about what those examples may mean and how they can be utilised in different contexts. Taranaki Mounga reminds us that care must be taken to ensure that those examples are considered and analysed with acknowledgement to their whakapapa (genealogy) and the context in which they arise…” (21)
Further, as Philippe Sands KC observes in an article for The Financial Times in which he argues for environmental legal rights and reviews two new books on the subject of the rights of nature, “the approach remains stubbornly anthropocentric. The environment is, in effect, a sideshow, one to be protected to better safeguard ourselves”. (22) Notably, his article does not seek to draw any parallels with or even mention the question of rights for nonhuman animals.
Whilst it seems therefore that those who advocate for nonhuman animal rights welcome and rely on wider rights for natural entities, the converse does not necessarily apply. This appears to be the result of the human-centric motivations and specific cultural contexts at play in the rights of nature movement.
How then could these developments be useful for the nonhuman animal rights cause?
One argument is that nonhuman animals, as sentient beings, are superior to nature in their claim to rights and thus a willingness to grant rights to natural entities should necessarily mean that they are entitled to rights. Further, whilst the rights of nature movement appears to be human-centric, this may in fact assist in arguing that nonhuman animals are more deserving of rights than nature by virtue of their being more closely aligned with humans due to their sentience.
Alternatively, and at the very least, nonhuman animals are part of nature and thus, as these recent developments would indicate, should therefore be capable of acquiring legal personhood in that sense.
Whilst obviously highly context specific, the deference and respect provided to the cultural context by the New Zealand legislation, including the Act, may provide a solid ground to argue for legal personhood for certain nonhuman animals where similar cultural factors are at play. For example, as noted in a previous A-Law Blog post (23), in 2024 tribal leaders from New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Tonga and French Polynesia signed a compact called He Whakaputanga Moana (Declaration for the Ocean) which, in effect, recognises the legal personhood of whales.
Similarly, and on a practical level, the fact that the Uttarakhand High Court decision was inspired by the legislative developments in New Zealand provides good evidence that positive legal developments in a rights movement in one part of the world have the potential to inspire novel and important changes in legal thinking in another. This can only be positive for the worldwide legal efforts being made to further the rights of nonhuman animals. This is particularly clear given that the very same Judge – Justice Ravij Sharma – formed part of the bench of the Uttarakhand High Court which, in a 2018 judgment, conferred personhood to nonhuman animals. (24)
On balance, whilst there are clearly important differences between the movements and the motivations driving these novel legal developments, it is anticipated that the continuing trend of granting legal personhood / rights to nonhuman entities will have positive implications for the nonhuman animal rights movement. This is achieved, as the Nonhuman Rights Project puts it, by urging “judges to think with more open-mindedness” and challenging a “human-centric view of the law”. (25)
About the author David Lewis-Hall, Barrister, MA (Oxon)
David was called to the Bar of England & Wales in 2010 and is a highly experienced litigator with a keen interest in animal law. Recommended in Legal 500 as an “outstanding lawyer” who is “very dedicated, responsive and effective”, David has extensive experience managing complex litigation including cross-border commercial disputes, and is an accomplished trial and appellate advocate. Drawing on his 15 years of legal experience and commitment to furthering the rights of nonhuman animals, David accepts instructions in all areas of animal law.
Footnotes:
(1) There may be a question as to whether the New Zealand Parliament has in fact ‘recognized’ or ‘granted’ legal personhood here; this distinction having potentially interesting and important wider implications for those seeking to build on this in a nonhuman animal rights context.
(2) There may be a question as to whether the New Zealand Parliament has in fact ‘recognized’ or ‘granted’ legal personhood here; this distinction having potentially interesting and important wider implications for those seeking to build on this in a nonhuman animal rights context.
(3) Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0007/latest/whole.html)
(4) Te Ture Whakatupua mō Te Kāhui Tupua 2025/Taranaki Maunga Collective Redress Act 2025 (https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2025/0001/latest/whole.html)
(5) Section 17 ‘Recognition of Te Kāhui Tupua’
(6) Section 18 ‘Te Kāhui Tupua as a legal person’
(7) Section 27 ‘Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi established’
(8) Section 28 ‘Purpose of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi’
(9) Section 29 ‘Functions of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi’
(10) Section 9 ‘Interpretation’ : “Te Tōpuni Ngārahu means the trust of that name established by the Te Tōpuni Ngārahu Trust Deed dated 1 September 2023 to be the collective governance entity for Ngā Iwi o Taranaki for the purposes of He Kawa Tupua”
(11) Section 31 ‘Appointments to Te Tōpuni Kōkōrang i’
(12) Ecuador First to Grant Nature Constitutional Rights (2008) Capitalism Nature Socialism, 19(4), 131–133. (https://doi.org/10.1080/10455750802575828)
(13) Demanda Generaciones Futuras v. Minambiente STC 4360-2018 (https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-others/)
(14) Eco Jurisprudence Monitor – Yurok Tribe Resolution Recognizing the Rights of the Klamath River (https://ecojurisprudence.org/initiatives/resolution-establishing-rights-of-the-klamath-river/)
(15) National Geographic – This Canadian river is now legally a person. It’s not the only one. (https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/these-rivers-are-now-considered-people-what-does-that-mean-for-travelers)
(16) Eco Jurisprudence Monitor – India court case Salim v. State of Uttarakhand establishing legal personhood for the Ganga and Yamuna Rivers (https://ecojurisprudence.org/initiatives/salim-v-state-of-uttarakhand/)
(17) India’s Ganges and Yamuna rivers are ‘not living entities’, BBC News, 7 July 2017 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40537701)
(18) Council champions ‘pioneering’ Rights of River Charter to protect ‘landmark waterway’ Lewes and Eastbourne Councils News, 19 March 2025 (https://www.lewes-eastbourne.gov.uk/article/3167/Council-champions-pioneering-Rights-of-River-Charter-to-protect-landmark-waterway)
(19) Mountain in New Zealand, canaries in Argentina recognized as rights-holders Nonhuman Rights Project Blog, 29 April 2025, Jake Davis (https://www.nonhumanrights.org/blog/nonhuman-personhood-argentina-new-zealand/)
(20) Te Pire Whakatupua mō Te Kāhui Tupua/Taranaki Maunga Collective Redress Bill — Third Reading Hansard, 30 January 2025 (https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/combined/HansDeb_20250130_20250130_36)
(21) Human Nature: Understanding the Constitutional and Indigenous Context of Granting Legal Personhood to Taranaki Mounga Oxford Human Rights Hub, 5 February 2025, Maisy Bentley (https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/human-nature-understanding-the-constitutional-and-indigenous-context-of-granting-legal-personhood-to-taranaki-mounga/)
(22) Why our planet (and not just its people) should have legal rights Financial Times, 25 April, 2025, Philippe Sands KC (https://www.ft.com/content/9fb7e995-eba8-43ae-ab95-f85cfda0d126)
(23) He Whakaputanga Moana, or, Declaration for the Ocean A-Law Blog, 20 April 2024, Ankita Shanker (https://www.alaw.org.uk/blog/2024/04/20/he-whakaputanga-moana-or-declaration-for-the-ocean/)
(24) Narayan Dutt Bhatt v Union of India and Ors. (2018) 3 RCR (Civil) 544; 2018 SCC OnLine Utt 645
(25) Nonhuman Rights Project – Mountain in New Zealand, canaries in Argentina recognized as rights-holders, 29 April 2025, Jake Davis (https://www.nonhumanrights.org/blog/nonhuman-personhood-argentina-new-zealand/)